The Leaked Report Pushing Mark Carney Toward the F-35 Fighter Jet


A table outlining 2021 Royal Canadian Air Force internal study comparing the F-35 fighter jet to Swedish Gripen. magically appeared in the press at that very moment it can most influence the choice to be made. The confidential internal document comes as Ottawa continues to renegotiate its deal to buy a full contingent of eighty-eight US-made F-35s following US President Donald Trump's threats to Canadian sovereignty – a process that is now bogged down by concerns within the RCAF that the purchase is becoming increasingly difficult to justify.

Using bright colors to drive home the point to the naysayers, the chart, which was reportedly obtained by Radio-Canada, shows that the F-35 (shown in a very nice and attractive green) is head and shoulders above the poor Gripen (shown in a mostly forbidding and dangerous red). F-35 supporters took up most of the table; I mean, how can you argue with real numbers?

Well, color me skeptical. The table compares the two aircraft based on broad criteria such as “mission accomplishment,” “upgradability,” “sustainability,” and others. But no explanation is given as to what these categories mean or how the numbers for each aircraft were arrived at. This raises questions.

For example, did the study compare the actual capabilities of the F-35 as they were in 2021, or the projected capabilities after its latest upgrade (known as Block 4) was applied? This is important because it is the Block 4 F-35 that has the capabilities that the RCAF envisions for the aircraft it will eventually acquire.

The catch is that the modernization of Block 4, according to September 2025 Report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, was more than five years late and more than $6 billion over budget, with costs still rising.

This raises an awkward question: Did the 2021 study compare the hypothetical, not-yet-real Block 4 F-35 to the 2021 Gripen? It matters.

Additionally, the RCAF table gives the Gripen equal performance with the F-35 in only one area, “resilience,” where the F-35 scores 85 percent and the Gripen scores 81 percent. Since we don't know what “resilience” means, it's hard to know exactly what these numbers mean, but it's a little curious that the F-35 performed so well.

According to June 2025 survey According to the Congressional Budget Office, the F-35 achieves “mission ready” status 50 to 60 percent of the time, far less than the Gripen's 80 to 90 percent readiness rate (according to Saab, the Gripen's manufacturer, as confirmed by various air forces that have tested the aircraft, such as Switzerland and Brazil).

While cost per flight hour is not directly related to mission readiness, it is also an important metric for comparing how many Air Forces can actually fly an aircraft. The more it costs, the less you'll have to fly. Here, according to sources for example, GAO and RAND Corporation, the F-35 costs US$33,000 to US$50,000 per flight hour (depending on variant), while the Gripen costs US$8,000 to US$12,000 per flight hour.

So it's a little puzzling that an aircraft that can complete a mission in about half the time and costs somewhere around $40,000 an hour scores on “sustainability” by a few percentage points. higher one that is available 80 percent of the time and costs approximately $10,000 per hour to operate. But since we don't know what “Support” actually means or how it was calculated, we don't know what to do with the table, do we?

One of the glaring areas where there is silence at the table is the question of “compatibility“with US aircraft – the ability to connect to American control systems, exchange target designation data in real time and operate as part of a single air fleet. This is a critical factor for the RCAF. Indeed, the other two competitors (French Rafale and Euro Typhoon) actually retreated from the competition early on because they felt the RCAF had rigged the situation to favor the selection of American aircraft.

My guess is that the RCAF hid compatibility in the Mission Accomplishment metric, where the F-35 scores 97 percent and the Gripen a measly 22 percent. But again, we don't know how the RCAF achieved this. For example, if this were a direct comparison of which aircraft in stock was better able to operate seamlessly with other American aircraft, then – guess what – the American aircraft would get much better results.

But there are a few important caveats.

First, Saab always said that the Gripen software could be modified by Canada to make it more compatible with US interoperability requirements, and that Canadian Gripens could be made unique in this regard. Indeed, since we intend to purchase the software source codes as part of a buy-and-build package in Canada, we may do so ourselves. Did the RCAF take this into account in their decision, or did they simply evaluate the ability of the finished 2021 Gripen to operate seamlessly with the USAF compared to the F-35 Block 4? We don't know, but it will make a huge difference.

Secondly, the “competition” took place in 2021. Sweden joined NATO in 2024 and thereby gained access to a number of protocols that allow Saab to integrate NATO standard capabilities into the Gripen software. (Actually, some of this was already built in before Sweden officially joined NATO.) They don't necessarily match Canada's unique NORAD requirements exactly, but they go a long way toward making the Gripen significantly more compliant. My guess is that if you analyze the “interoperability” metric against the Gripen standard released in 2024 after Sweden joined NATO, and then factor in the ability for us to program Canadian Gripens with unique software aligned with NORAD's mission, the interoperability gap is huge. many less.

But, again, we will never know; All the RCAF chart tells us is that the Gripen sucks compared to the F-35, but it doesn't tell us why.

The table does not, in any color, compare the potential difficulties of operating solely an aircraft that requires constant updates from a supplier to remain operational (with that supplier acting less and less like a friend every day), versus producing the aircraft here and having access to all the aspects needed to fully maintain and upgrade it yourself. I wonder how you would present this to the RCAF table?

Because if you draw a comparison on paper between the 2021 Gripen and a hypothetical Block 4 F-35, the F-35 wins, especially if you make compatibility with the US Air Force a key metric. But wars are not fought on paper. valid The important comparison is between a fighter that is available about 50 percent of the time, has not yet achieved its stated capabilities, costs so much to operate that you can't train as much as you'd like, and can be blocked by the supplier if it decides to do so. against an aircraft that is available more than 80 percent of the time can actually do what it says it will do, is available to operate, and over which we will have complete control to be able to tailor it to our needs and fly it no matter what.

The table presents the choice as if it were a straight choice between the F-35 and the Gripen, when the reality for Canada is that it is a choice between an Air Force relying solely on the F-35, as the RCAF wants, or an Air Force relying exclusively on the F-35, as the RCAF wants. mixes two planes combine the strengths and weaknesses of each aircraft, which will admittedly be more costly in terms of operation and maintenance than using just one aircraft. (Though, given the significant difference between the two aircraft's operating costs, buying and operating fewer F-35s in favor of some Gripens may only partially cover this amount.)

And we haven't even begun to talk about the industrial advantages of the two aircraft. The RCAF table says nothing about this.

But hey, it's a nice table. I mean, the colors are really beautiful.

Reprinted with permission from the site Center for International Policy Research.

Peter Jones is a professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa.

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