The puts it on the line high in what will be one of most expensive and important defense procurements in Canadian history as the Canadian government reconsiders its decision to buy the American F-35 fighter jet and takes another look at its competitor, the Swedish JAS Gripen.
There are a variety of issues involved – obviously military capabilities, but also trade and security relationships with competing producing countries, as well as the economic benefits Canada would receive from the purchase. The decision is also influenced by anti-American sentiment fueled by US President Donald Trump's annexationist threats, waging economic warfare through sectoral tariffs against Canada and a growing perception of the US as an unreliable ally. At the same time, we view the Nordic countries, including Sweden, as key partners, especially when it comes to Arctic security.
Difficult strategic calculations, economic issues vital to persuading the Canadian public, pressure campaigns, motivated leaks and strong waves of political emotion are also shaping the moment.
Another NATO ally, also with a history of close defense cooperation with the US, found itself in a very similar dilemma, trying to choose between the F-35 and the Saab Gripen. That country was Norway, and the story of its decision, which began in 2008, is deeply instructive. Norway beckons for another reason.
The Norwegian decision, like ours, was surrounded by intense political controversy, strong campaigning by both aircraft companies (Lockheed-Martin and Saab) and by both governments, anti-American sentiment on the socialist/labour side of Norwegian politics, and attempts to measure the relative economic benefits to Norway.
The decision was ultimately made in favor of purchasing the F-35. The Norwegian public was told that the decision was made solely on considerations of the aircraft's technical capabilities. The detailed Norwegian analysis in favor of the F-35 has never been made public.
The Canadian government has promised to release the results of its review of the fighter jet purchase, but how much of the actual decision-making calculations we'll see is anyone's guess, and there are bound to be significant restrictions on what is published to protect military secrets. Instead, we get a sprinkling of partial leaks to the media, which is clearly part of an influence campaign carried out by anonymous players.
But the Norwegian public received a leak of a completely different nature and scale. They were given the opportunity to look behind the scenes of the US government's support for the F-35. This all happened thanks to the massive release of US diplomatic cables (dubbed “Cablegate”) by Wikileaks and Julian Assange in 2010–2011.
One of these diplomatic cableA letter sent by the US Ambassador to Oslo on September 22, 2008 argued that the Norwegian government's decision had entered a critical phase, that public opinion was shifting toward opposition to the F-35, and that high-level advocacy by the US government was needed. The US Ambassador was concerned that any decision by Norway to purchase the Saab Gripen could have a knock-on effect on the pending decisions to purchase fighter jets by other European countries such as the Netherlands and Denmark, and could have very negative consequences for the bilateral relations – political, economic and military – between the US and Norway. Sound familiar?
Another significant cable Oslo, which emerged from Norway's decision to select the F-35 in November 2008, attempted to record that decision and teach some lessons for the United States. The document cites a series of visits by U.S. officials in the fall of 2008 “to make public the case for why the F-35 is an excellent choice, as well as a particular case for why the choice of aircraft will have an impact on bilateral relations.” The embassy noted that the Norwegian government's support for the F-35 was accompanied by “unusually harsh language (for domestic political reasons) claiming that the Gripen is uncompetitive.” It was noted that during a “very calm meeting” between the US ambassador and Norway's deputy defense minister, a Norwegian official said that it would be “very helpful” if the US government publicly emphasized the strength of the F-35 and confirmed that “there were no [US government] political pressure to buy the plane.” This is a strange question, unless you know the opposite is true.
The ambassador's cable emphasized that the ultimate success of the US campaign to sell the F-35 to Norway reflected the aircraft's technical capabilities, “despite obvious weaknesses in other areas such as industrial [benefits] “package” and followed consistent and sustained US public and private propaganda. He noted that the US campaign had tried to walk a careful line, at least in public statements, between direct pressure on Norway and more diplomatically worded reminders to the Norwegian government about the potential impact of the decision on bilateral relations. The ambassador noted that the private propaganda campaign was “much stronger” than the public one, presumably implying more of an iron fist and less of a velvet glove.
Is Canada on the cusp of making a commitment to its fighter jet's future, as Norway has done? Could some combination of the F-35's perceived technical superiority over the Saab Gripen for various classified military scenarios, coupled with a public and behind-the-scenes US pressure campaign, change the decision in favor of a full purchase of eighty-eight F-35 aircraft (thirty-six more than Norway bought)?
Canada may not follow Norway's path, but the circumstances are remarkably similar. We simply can't expect Canada's cable gates to take us behind the scenes. Instead, we get unabashed pressure and threats from the very public US Ambassador to Ottawa, Piet Hoekstra, who has warned of dire consequences for the NORAD Continental Defense Agreement and for Canadian trade with the US if the government refuses to buy the F-35.
What Norway has never considered is the possibility of buying a combination of F-35 and Saab Gripen, often referred to as a “mixed” fleet. Why not? The reason is simple. Norway's military needs are clearly different and far less complex than those facing Canada. They operate in one clearly defined regional geographic theater against one specific enemy on their doorstep: Russia. The Norwegian Air Force's mission is simpler than Canada's and can be accomplished with a single fighter jet.
A mixed fleet of fighter aircraft may become a strategic necessity for Canada in a way that has never been the case for the Norwegians.
There is no doubt that operating such a mixed fleet will be a challenge that will place pressure on pilot supplies, maintenance capabilities, infrastructure and basing, and supply chains. Yes, Canada has done this before, but in an era of much less sophisticated and simple fighter aircraft. Also, in an era where we had more Air Force pilots, bases and ground personnel. At one point in the 1960s, the Canadian Air Force operated three different fighter aircraft: the CF-100 (1952-1981), CF-104 (1961-1986) and CF-5 (1968-1995), and we managed, by inventing pilots and maintenance personnel, to keep the planes in the air. By the way, all three aircraft were produced in Canada.
But is there a path to achieving a responsible mixed fighter fleet in the coming decades? Former commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force Yves Blondin. believes There is. He thinks Canada should pursue a full purchase of the F-35 – despite its concerns about US control over software updates, weapons and sensor systems for the aircraft – but with a view to a subsequent purchase of a second European fighter such as the Saab Gripen in the mid-2030s.
He makes this argument by balancing NORAD's air defense needs with a “robust expeditionary capability in Europe.” This is a tempting option (although a full fleet of F-35s plus an additional complement of expeditionary aircraft would require very significant, perhaps enormous, costs).
Cost issues aside, the big problem with Blondin's mixed fleet concept is that it confuses the options. If Canada wanted to create a special air expeditionary force to operate in Europe with NATO, the best aircraft for this purpose would be the F-35, which is or will soon be operated by key NATO allies. The Saab Gripen, on the other hand, is well suited, perhaps better than the F-35, for the air defense and aerial surveillance or sovereignty assertion mission in Canada: it is faster, has a longer range, is more user-friendly, cheaper, more quickly deployable, more reliable in northern airspace and has a much better package of industrial benefits for Canada. In addition, it has all the necessary flight and sensor capabilities.
Buy enough Saab Gripen to meet Canada's air defense needs. Buy enough F-35s to create a credible NATO expeditionary force. Let the experts decide what those numbers should be and how to fit them into the schedule when we retire the long-standing CF-18s (Hornets). Forget the US argument that Canada should fly the same aircraft as the US for NORAD purposes. We don't have that now and never have (since the Korean War). As a writer Peter Jones argued in this space, arguments about compatibility issues lack any credibility.
Part of the problem of maintaining a mixed fleet can be solved by permanently basing and operating Canadian F-35s abroad as an expeditionary air force with a NATO ally. The mixed fleet will be divided into two fleets – one abroad, the other inland. We have a long history of such forward deployment during the Cold War, most notably with the stationing of Canada's CF-104 Starfighters in Germany.
In the current circumstances there are many European matches available, but Norway would be a great candidate. They are the first country to complete the full acquisition of their F-35 fleet, all fifty-two of which are now available to the Norwegian Air Force. They have almost ten years of experience working with aircraft. They have space available at Norwegian air bases with reinforced shelters for the Canadian contingent. Costs for maintenance and infrastructure, training and training can be shared. I was told that Norway would welcome a Canadian contingent. This will make a significant contribution to the desired Nordic security partnership and NATO. A win-win.
In the meantime, if Saab comes up with an offer to build an assembly plant in Canada, do it. The industrial benefits of the F-35 are negligible (as the Norwegians discovered). Producing the Saab Gripen in Canada will not be a repeat of the Avro Arrow, but something much more proven, real, realistic and necessary. This aircraft is well suited to Canada's air defense, deterrence and sovereignty protection missions and will represent a return to Canada's lost capability to produce advanced fighter aircraft.
Adapted from “F-35 Solution: Did Canada Get Pregnant in Norway?» Wesley Wark (Substack). Reprinted with permission of the author.
