WITHafter the quiet revolution, The question of who primarily identifies as Quebecois or Canadian remains a powerful marker of Quebec political and cultural life. The ambivalence of Quebec's identity is deeply rooted in a long historical evolution – from the “Canadians” of New France before the British conquest, to the “French Canadians” after the Act of Union of 1840, and finally to the “Quebecers” of today.
Recent studies of Quebec sovereignty and identity show that Quebecers' sense of belonging has developed. It's not so much a switch as it is a dial that gradually switches between shades of personality.
Most Quebec polls rarely go beyond the age-old question: “Would you vote for or against Quebec sovereignty if a referendum were held tomorrow?” Namely, Pallas Data survey published in September To News found that, with the exception of a majority that would vote “no” in a hypothetical referendum, most Quebecers don't even want the question asked again.
More detailed data from the Institute for Environmental Research and Léger point in the same direction. It confirms that if the Parti Québécois wins next year's provincial elections, Paul Saint-Pierre Plamondon – the lawyer-turned-politician who has led the PC since 2020 and promised another sovereignty vote – will have to give up his job.
AThis is part of the Confederacy of Tomorrow series. The Environment Institute recently surveyed a large sample of Canadians to measure attachment to both their country and their province. The survey included a large Quebec subsample of 1,074 adults. To the question “How attached are you to Canada?” 75 percent of respondents in Quebec answered either “somewhat attached” or “very attached,” a share that rose markedly among francophone countries.
The share of French-speaking Quebecers expressing a strong attachment to Canada has risen by six points since last year, according to Environics. A renewed sense of Canadian pride brought on by an increasingly hostile neighbor to the south? Maybe.
But when these sentiments are compared with hardline independence policies, the obstacles become clearer. To mark the thirtieth anniversary of the 1995 referendum, Leger last week published an in-depth study on issues of sovereignty and identity. At first glance, the figures were not encouraging for pro-sovereignty supporters: 59 percent of respondents said they would vote against independence if the referendum were held, compared with 31 percent who would vote in favor. These figures are closely related to other recent studies on the subject.
Could this just be a bad vote for Wu's side? Hardly. The same Léger poll showed the PQ with an eleven-point lead in voting intentions over the Liberal Party of Quebec and a twenty-seven point lead among francophones, results that would likely give the PQ a large majority in the National Assembly if they held out until next October. It is clear that the rise of the CoP through François Legault's coalition since 2023 has not led to increased support for sovereignty.
Léger's questionnaire went even further: respondents were asked how they identified themselves: only Canadian? More Canadians, but also Quebecers? As Canadian as Quebec? More Quebecers, but also Canadians? Only in Quebec? Among all respondents, 11 percent said they identified exclusively as Quebecers, while 29 percent identified as Quebecers but also as Canadians. According to Jean-Marc Léger in Montreal Magazinethis 40 per cent “Quebec First” segment marks a clear decline from about 65 per cent three decades ago.
In the same sample, 15 percent identify as Canadian only and 17 percent as Canadian primarily but also as Quebecers—for a total of 32 percent. Another 26 percent say they identify equally with both.
The result is a portrait of a province that may feel culturally distinctive but is not necessarily keen to sever ties to Canada.
The data, for example, clearly shows that Quebec identity is indeed divided, although blue (Quebec) outnumbers red (Canadian) in almost every demographic group except non-Francophones. Among young voters, the picture is more balanced: 38 percent identify primarily as Quebecers, 34 percent as Canadians. Among people aged thirty-five to fifty-four, three main categories fall within the six-score range.
When the results are broken down by party support, the expected pattern emerges: 70 per cent of PQ voters identify primarily as Quebecers, while 56 per cent of Quebec Liberal voters identify primarily as Canadians.
The same data can be viewed from another, equally revealing point of view, by distinguishing between those who identify exclusively with one nation and those who identify with bothno matter what they emphasize. This distinction separates so-called “hardliners” from those who identify with mixed identities—what we might call the “thin majority.”
In Quebec, 72 percent of respondents identify as both Quebecois and Canadian (to varying degrees), compared with 11 percent who identify only with Quebec and 15 percent with only Canada. This mixed identity group constitutes a solid majority among all demographic groups, with no statistically significant differences by gender or age. Among francophones, nearly eight in ten (78 percent) include both identities in their sense of self.
Breaking down the results by voting intention, Léger sees Quebec voters of all parties – even the PQ – identifying, at least in part, as Canadian. Only 26 percent of PQ voters identify exclusively as Quebecers.
But one conclusion seems inevitable: the balance of identity has shifted significantly toward Canada. And this shift matters because sovereignty campaigns are won or lost depending on where people feel they belong.
This part of the Léger poll will undoubtedly fuel the ongoing debate about Quebec's identity, providing all sides of the referendum with fresh data to analyze and interpret – especially ahead of an election year in which the PC and the Quebec Liberal Party are once again dominating the polls. These data (and many other polls conducted recently in Quebec) show that the renewal of the referendum is largely a top-down initiative on the part of the PC leader, rather than a bottom-up movement on the part of the silent majority.
Plamondon, who has repeatedly promised to hold a third referendumshows no signs of backing down—bad polls be damned. It was an easy promise when the KP was languishing with 15 percent support and going nowhere. But since the party rose to first place in the fall of 2023, the stakes have changed: a third referendum on Quebec secession no longer seems hypothetical.
However, these data also remind us that for the clear majority of Quebecers, identity is not a binary choice, but a wide spectrum of overlapping shades—or, if you prefer, fifty shades of purple.
All Léger survey data are available. Here.
