Mark Norman
Canadians could be forgiven for believing that the ongoing debate about which fighter jet we should buy is really about whether to buy
this is the best aircraft for our needs. Instead, the solution is a manifestation
conflicting and overlapping priorities
. Our
will become a lasting symbol of who we are as a country and what is important to us at this point in our history.
Thanks to our collective and systemic incompetence as a nation, we have given Mark Carney's government both the blessing and the curse of choice. If we had taken our defense responsibilities seriously in previous decades, we would have already had a new fleet of fighter jets and this painful debate might have been avoided.
I support the review
planned purchase of 88 F-35 aircraft
not because it's the wrong choice, but because it's forced us to have difficult conversations about what's important to us as a country, especially in the context of a world that looks very different than it did even a year ago.
There is no perfect answer to this riddle. Believing otherwise is naive, dangerous and unfair. Whatever choice the government makes will be criticized and celebrated with equal vigor from opposing sides. The government has no prospects and time is against it as pressure mounts on it to announce its chosen path.
Critics of the process and outspoken advocates of one choice over another are missing the point. Yes, the relative technical advantages of one aircraft over another will have undeniable operational consequences. The F-35 can do some useful things
I can’t, and vice versa.
The government will be given a detailed analysis of the operational advantages of one aircraft over another, and the continued interference of so-called experts adds nothing but noise to the process. But of all the factors a government must consider, the operational implications are less compelling than their strategic counterparts.
Reconciling the various benefits, risks and consequences of the two options is more difficult than it seems, since it is a matter of balancing competing national interests. At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, the conflicting tensions relate to our necessary military capabilities, our relationship with the United States, and our broader economic interests.
Although this hot potato has been politicized beyond imagination for decades, politics is not a factor in the current paradigm. There is no potential political victory for either the government or the opposition in this decision. This creates an unusually clean process that I find refreshing.
The F-35 is technically superior to the Gripen in many ways. This is excellence
. The initial price, technological dependence on the US and associated infrastructure and maintenance costs are perhaps disadvantages. Conversely, seamless integration with the US air defense system (i.e.
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
), superior operational capabilities and participation in a multinational supply chain are undeniable advantages.
The Gripen, despite obvious performance shortcomings, offers greater tactical versatility, ease of logistics, lower operating and maintenance costs, and technical independence from the United States. The potential benefits in terms of jobs and economic benefits could also be significant, but this is currently unproven.
The biggest risk with Gripen appears to be the possibility that Canada will find itself operationally isolated (in the context of NORAD, for example) or punished by Washington (in the context of our ongoing trade disputes). However, neither one nor the other is absolute; they are theoretical.
Perhaps the two aircraft could effectively complement each other if we could move beyond superficial and self-destructive arguments about why a mixed fleet is perceived as a bad idea. The US Ambassador's statements that we cannot afford such a solution are as arrogant as they are inappropriate.
For much of the 20th century, the Royal Canadian Air Force maintained a much larger fleet of fighter aircraft of various types. Yes, we face different challenges today, but if we continue to limit ourselves to what we don't think we can do, we will never become the country we need or want to be. It's about choice, and not everything is a zero-sum equation anymore.
If, for the purposes of analysis, we arbitrarily discount many economic benefits, cost factors, and operational considerations, this choice effectively comes down to how much we are willing to tolerate unspecified potential threats of retaliation or consequences from the United States.
If we've learned anything since February, it's that no matter what we do or say, the Donald Trump administration will find some obscure reason to bully or intimidate us. So, in essence, the fighter's decision depends on whether we are willing to pursue measurable benefits at the risk of some as-yet undetermined future consequences.
Or will we continue with the current plan and accept its inherent limitations and costs with the faith (or hope) that we can then move forward without any further risk or consequences?
Presenting this as a binary choice is perhaps the wrong approach. Instead, why not think bigger and acquire a reliable fleet of both aircraft and do it properly?
It is curious that during decades of Swedish neutrality, the Gripen was a suitable deterrent to Russian aggression, but is now somehow considered inadequate against the same potential adversary in the North American context. For those who may ask, what about China? This is perhaps as good a reason as any to have more than one arrow in your quiver.
Imagine a hybrid fleet consisting of both aircraft providing air defense at home, a squadron of Gripens deployed forward to directly support Canadian forces on the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and another squadron of F-35s ready to deploy to the Pacific to support our interests in the region. Isn't this what we should be as a country?
Mark Norman is a retired Vice Admiral who commanded the Royal Canadian Navy and was Deputy Chief of Defense. He consults for several Canadian defense companies.
