“To hell with the torpedoes, full speed ahead” – former US Admiral David Farragut
At the risk of distorting this great quote, the events surrounding the government's plan to replace four obsolete
which have served Canada since the late 1990s have been debated for weeks and need a reboot.
The submarine program has become a symbol of urgent need
modernize the long-suffering Canadian Armed Forces
(CAF), as well as the government to demonstrate long overdue changes to procurement processes.
Essentially, the government has seized on the demand to purchase up to 12 modern, conventionally powered submarines to demonstrate to our allies and Canadians that the tide has turned and that Mark Carney's government is serious about rebuilding the Air Force.
I applaud the Prime Minister's personal leadership in
and I'm impressed that he actively attends both
. I want to believe that his personal leadership is also responsible for the recent decision
improve the selection process to two potential suppliers
. In the past, such a process would have taken years, and the current government has taken steps to change the way business is done with unprecedented willingness and commitment.
Apart from this obvious change in behaviour, there is also a stated intention to rebuild our domestic industrial capacity and capabilities. Taken together, these changes reflect a sophisticated approach to
this has been sorely lacking for decades. However, it is hard work and the results will not necessarily be immediate or obvious.
Regarding the submarine project specifically, the government essentially decided that Canada would buy either a Korean or a German submarine. While there are some notable technical differences between the two, they are essentially similar offerings.
Imagine comparing the relative merits of the Kia Sportage and Volkswagen Tiguan. Both are modern, capable and arguably indistinguishable compact SUVs that offer consumers excellent performance, reliability and value.
Imagine further that the decision to buy one car over another was related not only to the individual characteristics of the cars or their purchase price, but also to the factor
long-term partnership with the manufacturer and the founding country. Simply put, this is where we are.
Both suppliers are now fully informed of Canada's expectations and have been asked to submit detailed proposals over the next few months. Given the similarity of their proposals and the unequivocal statement by the Royal Navy and the Government of Canada that “they both meet the requirements,” the decision will come down to cost, timing and overall value to Canada.
While I fully support the actions taken to date, there are some concerns about how this program is being implemented in the public domain. In particular, I am somewhat confused by the apparent obsession with planning and some of the language regarding potential economic benefits for Canada, both of which are being abused or weaponized.
First of all, while I generally support the urgency of the timeline applied to this project, we need to be careful not to overemphasize this consideration. I've seen strategies like this before, and they tend to distort behavior and limit thinking. Planning is important, but it is not absolute.
Over the past decade or so, Canada has gone more than 1,000 days without an operational submarine. It is as much an acknowledgment of past failures as it is a warning. When we characterize the planning crisis, it needs to be placed in the correct context.
Moreover, given the relatively small number of submariners in the fleet and the limited ability to train more crews, the idea of having brand new submarines docked without qualified crews is potentially foolish. I am not for a moment suggesting that we ignore the urgency of the problem, but we must be careful not to blindly follow one criterion at the expense of others.
Secondly, I am increasingly concerned about the way the phrase “
“used without proper context or nuance to suggest or refute any particular approach.
For example, recent comments from ministers and senior government officials that submarines “will not be built in Canada” are as troubling to some as they are potentially intuitive to others. We need to make an important distinction between verbs such as produce, produce, make, assemble and build. They all add value, and making an open or arbitrary distinction without considering how and where value can be added in a process as complex as building a submarine is extremely unhelpful.
Individual parts, components and assemblies are manufactured in various locations and assembled at the final location. This is normal and no exception for cars, planes, ships and submarines. Yes, there are economies with vertical integration, but they are rare.
Thus, the economic value to Canada in the context of 12 new submarines should not explicitly prohibit the production, fabrication or even partial assembly of printable components or assemblies, especially if we have ambitions to support the submarines throughout their service life.
As a country, we are faced with a series of unprecedented, overlapping and interconnected challenges and opportunities. We cannot afford to end ourselves, make unforced errors, or shoot ourselves in the foot. I would like to think that, despite all the ongoing efforts to harness the enormous potential for increased defense spending, we will not deliberately or unintentionally limit our options simply because we have either signed up for a self-created crisis or because we do not understand the meaning of our own words.
Mark Norman is a retired Vice Admiral who commanded the Royal Canadian Navy and was Deputy Chief of Defense. He consults for several Canadian defense companies.
