As the aircraft carrier USS Gerald Ford heads to the Caribbean, the US military continues to strike drug ships off the coast of Venezuela and the Trump administration. discusses what to do When it comes to Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, one thing is certain: Venezuela and the Western Hemisphere would be better off if Maduro packed his bags and spent his remaining years in exile.
This is certainly something Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado is working on. This year's Nobel Prize winner She has recently spent much of her time in the US lobbying politicians to force Maduro out of power. Machado is constantly under threat of detention in his own country. providing interviews and participation in conferences to advocate for regime change. Her talking points are clearly aimed at the Trump administration: Maduro is the head of a drug cartel poisoning Americans; his dictatorship rests on weak foundations; and the forces of democracy inside Venezuela are fully poised to seize the mantle as soon as Maduro leaves. “We are ready to take over the government” – Machado said Bloomberg News in an October interview.
But as the old saying goes, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. While there is no doubt that Maduro is a despot and a fraud who is stealing elections, American politicians cannot simply take what Machado says for granted. Washington learned this the hard way in the run-up to the Iraq War, when an opposition leader named Ahmed Chalabi sold American politicians a bill of goods on how painless rebuilding Iraq would be after Saddam Hussein. We all know how that story turned out: The United States faced an occupation that consumed American resources, caused unpredictable regional consequences, and proved more complex than its proponents initially claimed.
To be fair, Machado is no Chalabi. The latter was a fraud; the first is the head of the opposition movement, whose candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia, received two thirds of the votes during the 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections (Maduro declared victory anyway and forced González to leave the country). But just because she has good motives doesn't mean we shouldn't question her claims.
Will regime change in Caracas lead to the Western-style democracy that Machado and her supporters expect? None of us can exclude this. But the Trump administration cannot expect this to be the outcome of a post-Maduro future. Other scenarios are just as likely, if not more so—and some of them could lead to more violence among Venezuelans and more problems for U.S. policy in Latin America.
The big problem with regime change is that you can never be completely sure what will happen after the incumbent leader is removed. Such operations are inherently dangerous and destabilizing; political orders are deliberately destroyed, the haves become have-nots, and voters who are accustomed to holding the reins of power suddenly find themselves outsiders. When Hussein was overthrown in Iraq, the military officers, Ba'ath Party supporters and regime-linked sycophants who had ruled the country for nearly a quarter of a century were forced to make do with a completely new situation. The Sunni-dominated structure was overthrown, and members of the Shia majority, previously oppressed, now willingly took their place at the top of the system. This, coupled with the US decision to ban anyone associated with the old regime from holding public office, set the stage for a large-scale insurgency that challenged the new government, sparked a civil war and killed tens of thousands of Iraqis.
Regime change can also lead to a complete absence of power, as happened in Libya after the US and NATO intervention there in 2011. Like Maduro today, Muammar Kadafi was a reviled figure whose demise was supposed to pave the way for a democratic utopia in North Africa. The reality was completely different. Instead, Gaddafi's ouster has sparked conflict between Libya's main tribal alliances, rival governments and the proliferation of terrorist groups in the country south of the European Union. Fifteen years later, Libya remains a country plagued by militias, warlords and weak institutions.
Unlike Iraq and Libya, Venezuela has a history of democratic governance. It has held relatively free and fair elections in the past and does not suffer from the sectarian divisions common to Middle Eastern states.
However, this is little consolation for those awaiting a democratic transition. Indeed, for such a transition to be successful, the Venezuelan army must be committed to it, either by remaining on the sidelines as the Maduro regime collapses, actively arresting Maduro and his top allies, or by agreeing to shift its support to the new authorities. But again, this is no easy task, especially for a military whose leadership is key to the survival of the Maduro regime, which is accustomed to making obscene amounts of money from illegal undercover activities and whose troops have been implicated in human rights abuses. The same elites who profited generously from the old system will have to cooperate with the new one. This is unlikely, especially if their slice of the pie shrinks the moment Maduro leaves.
Finally, while regime change may seem like a good solution to Venezuela's problem, it may only make the difficulties worse over time. Although the Maduro regime's powers are already limited, its complete dissolution could open up interactions between elements of the former government, drug trafficking organizations and existing armed groups such as the Colombian Army of National Liberation, which have long viewed Venezuela as a base of operations. Any post-Maduro government will have difficulty coping with all of this as it tries to restructure Venezuela's economy and rebuild its institutions. The Trump administration would then face the prospect of Venezuela becoming an even bigger source of drugs and migration, the very outcome the White House is trying to prevent.
Maria Corina Machado may have been right after all. But she's selling the best-case assumption. The US should not buy into this. Democracy after Maduro is possible, but it is hardly the only possible outcome—and certainly not the most likely.
Daniel R. DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities..
