Africa’s drone wars are growing, but they rarely deliver victory

In the last decade armed drones have become one of the most visible symbols of modern warfare. Armed drones, once the preserve of frontline militaries, are now widely available on the global arms market. Countries like Türkiye, China and Iran produce cheaper models and export them. In the ongoing war in Sudan, which began in 2023, drones were used two main belligerents to succeed, but this led to mass civilian casualties in progress.

Essentially, a drone is a remotely piloted aircraft that can observe, track, and sometimes hit targets with missiles or bombs. The promise of armed drones is tantalizing: lethal, accurate and affordable weapons that can observe and strike enemies without endangering troops. But can these drones deliver on their promise in combat in Africa? Brandon J. Cannon shares insights from his experience research on the use of drones in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa.

What is driving drone use in sub-Saharan Africa?

Drones offer tactical advantages. They are seen as a solution to pressing internal security problems, starting with Jihadist invasion of the Sahel To armed uprisings in Ethiopia And civil war in Sudan.

Since 2019, an increasing number of African states, including Niger, Ethiopia, Togo, Sudan and Somalia, purchased long-range, medium-altitude drones (Male). Among these types of drones Turkish Bayraktar TB2.– along with its successors, TB3 and Kızılelma (Red Apple) – attracted enormous attention. For example, in the case of the Turkish TB2 model, according to some sources, Since 2019, 40 units have been sold to more than 10 African countries.but the actual numbers are not disclosed.

TB2 is cheap by military standards (approx. US$5 million unit) and are relatively easy to use. He was proclaimed “turning point“for its reliability, cost and availability.

It was battle tested in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus – the natural border between Europe and Asia.

Its success in destroying tanks, artillery and air defense systems in these conflicts impressed African leaders. How Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan boasted “Everywhere I go in Africa, everyone talks to me about drones.”

How effective have these drones been in African conflicts?

Long-range, mid-altitude drones such as the TB2 are deployed in African conflicts, which are characterized by vast geography, difficult terrain, and complex insurgencies that often cross borders.

While drones can deliver lethal force, their ability to influence the outcome of a battle also depends on variables such as

• distance, terrain and weather
• operator competence
• availability of auxiliary intelligence, logistics and control systems.

Given these variables, my a recent study with my colleague Ash Rossiter found that Drones are unlikely to significantly change the course of conflicts in much of sub-Saharan Africa for several reasons.

First, there is a general lack of a modern, comprehensive air defense system in the region. This is essential for using drones as lethal precision weapons, especially against isolated groups.

Secondly, the success of these drones depends on proper operation, their use in sufficient numbers and adequate supporting infrastructure such as fuel, communication masts and ground control stations. They are often in short supply in remote areas where insurgents operate in places such as Somalia, Niger and northern Burkina Faso.

What factors limit the lethality of drones?

Where the enemy does not have a modern integrated air defense system (which is now common among rebel and militia forces in much of sub-Saharan Africa), drones can hang around with minimal risk. They can gather useful information and carry out precision strikes against vehicles, small groups and supply lines.

However, this lethality is limited by a number of factors.

Distance: The size and scale of Africa reduces the range of drones and therefore their effectiveness. For example, the TB2's range of about 300 km means it has proven itself well in the Caucasus. However, in Ethiopia or the Sahel you won’t get far within 300 km. In Ethiopia, for example, TB2 had to moved government in 2022 from bases near Addis Ababa to Bahir Dar. It was a distance of about 300 km to achieve targets in Tigray. This shows how drone bases, security architecture and advanced infrastructure such as communications masts and logistics support are needed closer to conflict zones. This increases the range and therefore the results.

Terrain and weather: Dust and sandstorms in the Sahel can damage drones' visible light sensors. The region experiences frequent sandstorms, especially during the dry season. Dense forest canopies in Central Africa can hide traffic from drones. Persistent cloudiness over the Ethiopian highlands or along the Gulf of Guinea may limit effectiveness. Electro-optical and infrared payloadwhich provide high-definition images and thermal imaging, give drones like the TB2 a 360-degree view. This allows them to work in different weather conditions. But they may have to fly in bad weather to see targets in this African territory. This carries its own risks, as it exposes drones to potential small arms fire. This happened in Sudan, where paramilitary forces reported the downing of army drones in August 2025.

Operator capabilities: Effectively flying a drone requires trained operators, disciplined targeting procedures, and reliable maintenance. Failures can be costly. A TB2 accident in Burkina Faso in 2023 exposed maintenance and operational vulnerabilities by destroying one of five TB2 drones in Burkina Faso's arsenal. A 2023 Nigerian drone strike that was reportedly aimed at terrorists killed him instead. about 85 civilians. This happened after an incorrect snap to the grid. It highlighted how poor operator capabilities can turn precision weapons into precursors to tragedy.

Suitable for conflict: Drones are most useful for targeting supply convoys, targeting specific targets, and destroying loose networks of militants. These are missions typical of low-intensity and irregular warfare. They are much less resolute in conflicts against massed military formations or for the retention of territory, which characterized recent wars in Ethiopia and Sudan. These tasks continue to be assigned to fighter-bombers or attack aircraft, as well as ground troops.

What does all this mean for the use of drones in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa?

First, mid-altitude, long-range drones can provide tactical advantages, but are rarely a panacea.

Initial impressions of the TB2 unfortunately overshadowed some of its limitations, such as long-distance operations in inclement weather and the importance of operator skill.

Secondly, in conflicts such as Ethiopia and the Sahel, geography and logistics play a critical role. Posing, relay communications, and advanced maintenance determine a drone's reach, persistence, and strike power.

Third, the overall impact of drones depends on trained crews, reliable maintenance, and disciplined targeting and command control. The weakness of any of these factors can lead to tragedy, such as the death of civilians.

Finally, as non-state armed groups increasingly use drones and some African states, such as Rwanda and Kenya, begin to use more advanced air defense systems, the advantage currently enjoyed by national governments owning drones will narrow.

Thus, lasting usefulness requires three things.

The first is anti-drone defense, which means countries need to develop strategies and acquire sensors, jammers and systems to detect, track and neutralize hostile drones.

Second, better protection of the locations and networks from which drones are controlled so they cannot be disrupted, sabotaged or attacked.

Third, sustainable investment not only in drone acquisition, but also in maintenance, operator training and deployment infrastructure to support continued flight operations and expansion drone penetrate deeper into the combat space.

This article has been republished from Talk under Creative Commons license. Read original article.